1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
3	SOUTHERN DIVISION
4	HOWARD HOLT, ET AL.,
5	Plaintiff, No. 1:15cv931
6	vs.
7	CITY OF BATTLE CREEK,
8	Defendant.
9	Before:
10	THE HONORABLE JANET NEFF,
11	U.S. District Judge Grand Rapids, Michigan
12	Thursday, August 23, 2018 Trial Proceedings, Volume II
13	APPEARANCES:
14	Avanti Law Group MR. ROBERT ANTHONY ALVAREZ
15	MR. AGUSTIN HENRIQUEZ, JR. 600 28th Street SW
16	Wyoming, MI 49509 616-257-6807
17	On behalf of the Plaintiff;
18	Kreis Enderle Callander & Hudgins PC
19	MR. MARK E. KRETER MR. DANIEL WALLACE BOOCHER
20	One W. Michigan Avenue Battle Creek, MI 49017
21	269-966-3000
22	On behalf of the Defendant.
23	REPORTED BY: MS. KATHY J. ANDERSON, RPR, FCRR
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August 23, 2018 1 2 PROCEEDINGS, 10:38 a.m. THE LAW CLERK: All rise, please. Court is now in 3 session. You may be seated. 4 THE COURT: Good morning, everybody. 5 MR. KRETER: Good morning, Your Honor. 6 MR. ALVAREZ: Good morning. 7 THE COURT: Well, we are a little late getting started 8 this morning, but let's get to it. 9 Mr. Kreter, you have a motion to make, I think. 10 MR. KRETER: Yes, Your Honor. And just for the 11 record, the city representative today is Linda Morrison. She's 12 the finance director. She was also on our may call witness 13 list. We have decided not to call her as a witness. 14 THE COURT: Okay. 15 MR. KRETER: Therefore, I don't think the 16 sequestration order applies, and I have talked to Mr. Alvarez 17 about that. 18 THE COURT: Okay. 19 20 MR. KRETER: He's agreed. THE COURT: Thank you, Your Honor. We are making a 21 motion to dismiss pursuant to FRCP 52(c). We would ask the 22 23 Court to enter a judgment in favor of the defendant on issues which we feel the plaintiff has failed to meet their burden of 24 proof on. 25

Almost as a housecleaning matter, the first issue, so I don't forget it, is willful violation. Plaintiff has claimed that there was a willful violation of FLSA by the defendants. There was no evidence presented that the City of Battle Creek knew or showed reckless disregard of the matter of whether it conducted or -- whether it violated the statute. There was no knowing, willful, or bad faith conduct on the City of Battle Creek. There was no evidence. So I think that count should be dismissed by the Court.

We then get to the exempt status. And as we have discussed, and the Court is well aware, we have got the executive and the administrative exemptions. I pointed out yesterday that the United States Supreme Court in Encino versus Navarro has now said that when looking at the exemption, a fair interpretation is required. No longer a strict interpretation.

I also believe that the case is in a position now, given that this is a bench trial, the Court can draw reasonable conclusions from the testimony presented by the parties, the cross-examination, and the exhibits, all of which have been admitted into evidence.

I don't want to be redundant so I'm going to probably meld a few of these arguments together because they do cross over between the administrative and the executive exemption.

So I'll start with discretion and independent judgment.

That is an element of the administration. It's an

element in dispute.

The testimony has been that there are 75 to 90 people in the City of Battle Creek Fire Department. Plaintiffs are the second highest ranking officers. It's implicit that they were allowed to and had to exercise their independent judgment and discretion for any organization to operate the way the City of Battle Creek's fire department operated. They were a well organized and well oiled machine. And that was because of the hierarchy that they had in place, and that hierarchy included management by the battalion chiefs. And I would point out it's a hierarchy; it's military; I heard it is the military hierarchy. It is not a dictatorship as would be implied by some of the plaintiffs's testimony yesterday. Certainly Chief Houseman was hands on but that doesn't change the exempt status.

The plaintiffs testified yesterday that Chief Hampton was hands off. The comment, the testimony was that Hampton said, "Keep me apprised. If anything comes up, let me know."

Clearly when they were working for Chief Hampton, they were exercising their own discretion and running the day-to-day operation of the fire department.

Chief Schmaltz, he testified or the plaintiffs testified, that while he was getting acclimated, "Do what you've been doing." And Chief Schmaltz testified that he gave them discretion, that he let them run their jobs as battalion

chiefs. And, again, their jobs were of significant importance to the City of Battle Creek and the fire department.

I would also point out that unfettered discretion is not required. Everyone, almost everyone, unless you're a entrepreneur, has a boss, has somebody to report to. That in and of itself does not take away the exemption.

And let's look to the next element, what were they involved in? Were they doing things that were significant to the business or operation of the Battle Creek Fire Department? We submit they were. There is no dispute they did job evaluations; there is no dispute they were involved in the disciplinary process. They could give oral discipline, written warnings, and if it went beyond that, the testimony is, there was discussion with the chief.

Chief Schmaltz also testified that he sought input from plaintiffs on the standard operating procedures. This was the play book. I hate to compare this to a sporting event or a football game, but the standard operating procedures was the play book and that was what helped the City of Battle Creek Fire Department run as efficiently as it did. And Chief Schmaltz at least on 25 e-mails in the exhibits asked for input from the battalion chiefs in putting together, amending, revising the standard operating procedures.

Chief Schmaltz also testified that it would be the responsibility of the battalion chiefs to implement those

standard operating procedures.

Then we look at the job duty. The suppression chief. Chief Holt. He oversaw the captains and lieutenants. That's 24 to 27 people that he supervised directly under him. He maintained standards. He was involved in facility issues, manpower scheduling, uniform and turnout gear. All of these were significant functions, managerial functions when running the Battle Creek Fire Department.

Administrative chief, Battalion Chief Erskine was involved in training, HazMat, road safety, standard operating procedures, involved in putting together the plan of the day, the plan of the week, he handled special PR events.

Then we have other significant activities. They were media spoke persons, the station transfers ran through them, they were on the list of people you could report discrimination complaints to. Even their uniforms were different because of the position that they had in the Battle Creek Fire Department. And Mr. Erskine testified it was a position that he aspired to. And which in and of itself acknowledges the importance of this position in the fire department.

We go to management duties. Chief Schmaltz testified that they were part of the senior management team. Mr. Holt and Mr. Erskine wrote a letter on June 4th, 2014, that talked about cohesive team of chief officers to operate the fire department. Referred to our level of management. When it was

to their benefit, they were on the management team. When it isn't to their benefit, like this trial, they decide they are not responsible for management responsibilities.

Then we look at another factor. It's under the administrative exemption. Was the performance of officer nonmanual work directly related to managerial or general business operation. There was no significant manual work performed by these battalion chiefs. Sure, when you have a catastrophic event, 192-car accident on I-94 that closes it down for days, in those exceptional circumstances, they may have had to perform some manual work. But that was not their primary function. Just because they were capable of doing it, just because they took their turnout gear, doesn't mean that was their primary function. Their primary function was nonmanual labor and their primary duties was of important significance to the business and management of the Battle Creek Fire Department.

We go to the executive exemption. And an issue is well, they can't hire and fire because the Battle Creek collective bargaining agreement, they have a collective bargaining agreement with the fire fighters that says they follow civil service rules. Well, Schmaltz, Chief Schmaltz said that he gives particular weight to their opinions with promotions; he also indicated that the one instance where they did let a probationary fire fighter go, and it wasn't in

consultation with either of these battalion chiefs, but another battalion chief, he gave weight to their recommendation.

And then most importantly, I left this to last, but it's the most important function. Suppressing fires. As chief, as Mr. Holt said, the primary function of the City of Battle Creek Fire Department is to mitigate emergencies and safety of personnel. And that's when they were on a fire scene. And we have gone through a lot of testimony regarding how the battalion chiefs, what their responsibilities were at the fire scene. And it's clear, they managed it, they led it, they directed it, they took all the SOPs and protocols that were developed during the non fire working day to operate a fire scene, to analyze what was going on, to decide what tactics were going to be used. The most important function of the fire department the battalion chiefs were in charge of.

And ultimately, they were accountable for that fire scene.

So we feel that the evidence is overwhelming that either under the executive exemption or the administrative exemption plaintiffs are exempt employees and therefore the case should be dismissed on that basis alone.

In the event the Court disagrees with me, we then get to the standby time and the issue is was standby so onerous as to prevent plaintiffs from effectively using their personal time for personal pursuits.

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One, they were only required to respond to structure fires. Chief Schmaltz testified to that. Two, there was no requirement to monitor radio traffic. Chief Schmaltz left his radio in the car. He only used his pager. You could put your pager on alert. When there was an all stations call, the pager went off. That's what Chief Schmaltz testified he did, and that's what the plaintiffs could have done. Instead, they chose to monitor the radio themselves.

The records show that there are 124 to 137 structure fires in a three-year period. About one a week. Payroll records show that Erskine averaged 3.4 hours of overtime when on standby; that Mr. Holt averaged 2.2 hours of overtime when on standby. Again, that's consistent with about one fire a There were no dress restrictions when they are on The only restrictions were that they could not consume alcohol and had to be able to respond in a reasonable And there was no need that they respond in four minutes time. because they would have engine companies there. And that they could listen to their radio as they're driving there to help manage the scene. And let's not lose sight, this standby was negotiated as part of the collective bargaining agreement. E-mail from plaintiffs to Chief Schmaltz was they did not want to switch from the 40-hour standby arrangement to the 24/48-hour arrangement. When I asked Mr. Erskine yesterday about that, he said that was a negotiating ploy. I think he

has to live with his negotiating ploy.

Plaintiffs chose to limit their activities while they were on standby. It was not onerous. Chief Schmaltz said it was not onerous. There are times when you decide to take an upper level management position you have some tradeoffs. And yes, they had to be on standby. That was their tradeoff, but it wasn't onerous to the extent it impacted their personal life.

I think part of the problem is that plaintiffs, they're dedicated fire fighters. They have spent their careers fire fighting; they came up through the ranks; and at least from a mental standpoint, they never could switch from rank and file to management. Although, in fact, they were managing the fire department as battalion chiefs.

So we would ask the Court to dismiss plaintiffs's complaint for the reasons stated. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Kreter. Any response from the plaintiffs?

MR. ALVAREZ: Yes, Your Honor. First off, Your Honor, with regard to the good faith argument that the defendants have raised, I will note that that is an affirmative defense which they have the burden of proving. And at least as of now, they have not met that burden.

Going directly to the motion for directed verdict at this point. I think the Court needs to consider the unique

circumstances of this case. This is not just about employees working a few hours a week of overtime. We are talking about two fire fighters who were working full-time, 24-hour days for seven days a week every other week. There was a short period of time when it was every third week but it was still the majority of the time that we are talking about here is every other week they were working seven days straight, 168 hours. That they were at the beck and call of the city.

It is also important to note that when they did respond, when they were on-call, when they did respond, they were paid for that time. And they were paid at a rate of time and a half. Essentially they were getting paid overtime. As they pointed out, as defendant pointed out, they were being paid 3.4 hours of overtime on average a week. So when they did respond, they were being paid overtime.

Now, this isn't a business where they are making widgets, where they are selling goods. This is a fire department where even the defendant in its opening argument has conceded that on a day-to-day basis the fire department is a very organized organization. Everything employees do during the course of the week is designed to suppress or prevent fire. That's what the fire department does. This isn't some major corporation, this isn't some store, this isn't a restaurant, this is a fire department. A public utility that's at the service of the community.

And so the focus needs to be on what exactly is the primary duty of a battalion chief, and what was their primary duty during that period of time that we are talking. It's important to distinguish the work that they were doing and what they were required to do during the period of time at issue here, and how things are now.

And I'll explain.

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The period of time at issue here, when they were working alternating weeks, they were the only two battalion chiefs on duty. The only two. And they had to alternate for a short period of time with Chief Houseman every other week, but they were the only two battalion chiefs on duty that were required to, as Mr. Holt testified, required to monitor the radio. Not just listen for the alarm to go off for the all stations call, but to also monitor the radio. That was his testimony. Now, what Chief Houseman did during his turn, who knows. But he was only there for a short period of time. Chief Schmaltz testified that he left his radio in the car, as they said. However, Chief Schmaltz also for a period of six months did not participate in the rotation, and then interestingly enough, once he did participate, the schedule changed. And they now have a completely different schedule where it's only required that they spend one night a week working a 24-hour rotation. It's no longer the every other week burden that they had to carry for those three years or so.

So what is the primary duty? Primary duty is defined as the principal, main or most important duty that the employee performs. Among those factors that the Court should consider is the relative importance of the exempt duties as compared with other types of duties and the amount of time performing that work. In this case, Your Honor, as they testified, during the standby weeks, as even the job descriptions themselves say, responding to alarms, and other types of alarms, fire alarms and other types of alarms was not just an essential job function, it was the most important job function as testified to by both plaintiffs.

No matter what they were doing, whether they were writing a report, doing an evaluation, whether they were sending e-mails, no matter what they were doing at that point in time, if a call came through, they had to respond. Whether it was on standby time or during their regular scheduled shift. They had to drop what they were doing and respond. And it's important to note, Your Honor, that it's not just a matter of just showing up and running the show, if that's the case, then acting Chief Hampton would have been able to respond to calls. But he couldn't. And why couldn't he? Because acting Chief Hampton was not a fire fighter. Was not trained as a fire fighter. And so acting Chief Hampton could not participate in the rotation, could not respond to calls, could not take command. Why? Because he was not a fire fighter. Even today,

Your Honor, the acting Chief Blocker is also the police chief.

And he also does not respond to any calls because he is not trained as a fire fighter.

That I think is key and instructive as to what was the primary duty of these individuals.

Also, captains and lieutenants, they took command. When they were on the scene, they were also officers, they also could take command. And for the most part, if when they arrived, they took command and only when the battalion chiefs arrived would they then transfer command to themselves. But the captains and lieutenants, who are not exempt from overtime, who receive overtime when they work overtime, are being, are part of the incident command and they take command.

The physical requirements for the battalion chiefs are the same as the captains, as the lieutenants, and as the fire fighters. The turnout gear that they have, they have to have it with them. When they were on standby, when they were on standby, they had to have that in their vehicle, and both of them testified that on a few occasions they put on their gear and Mr. Holt actually fought a couple of fires.

Now, sure, it wasn't a huge structure fire, he wasn't running in with his SCBA but he still fought a fire. He was there first and he acted as a fire fighter, and he put out the fire.

When they were on standby time, they never knew when a

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call was coming in. I think I, I stressed that often in the testimony from all the witnesses so I won't belabor that point.

With regard to independent judgment, the defendants concedes that Chief Houseman was hands on. And as a matter of fact, as both of the plaintiffs testified, yes, he was. wanted everything to be run through him. And though Chief Hampton was hands off, essentially as defendants point out, there was already a standard operating procedures, the play book, by which they each had to follow. That was the play That was how they knew what they had to do with regard to everything, every procedure related to the fire department. They were restricted, not just by the standard operating procedure, but by the collective bargaining agreement of the local fire fighters union and by the civil service rules, and by directives that were given by the chief. They had no discretion. They had no independent judgment. Everything they did had to conform either to the standard operating procedures which were in place; Chief Schmaltz may have asked for some advice when he arrived, but during the period of time that they were working for Chief Houseman, Chief Hampton, they had to follow what was already in place.

Titles and uniforms are irrelevant in a determination as to whether a person is executive or administrative or exempt. So I don't believe that that's something that needs to be considered.

The e-mail that defendant refers to as having been sent by the battalion chiefs, by the plaintiffs, regarding the change in the schedule and the change with regard to the car, yes, they sent the e-mail. But was anything done? Was their opinion taken into consideration? No. Because ultimately nothing happened with those e-mails. Nothing happened with their complaint. Nothing happened with their suggestion that they work together as a cohesive management team. Nothing happened. The schedule still changed, the car issue remained the same. And regarding discipline, they both gave examples, multiple examples of times when they wanted certain disciplinary actions to take place against a fire fighter and the chief said no.

So far, we have only had one example from the defendants, from Chief Schmaltz, and that wasn't even related to these two plaintiffs. It was another battalion chief. We don't know what the circumstances were.

The defendant concedes that per the collective bargaining agreement and per the civil service rules, they couldn't hire and fire anyone. Everything had to happen through the civil service rules, and the standard operating procedures for discipline, and they had no authority, no right, no weight that was given to their recommendations at that point.

If any of the candidates that they liked did meet the

civil service rules, they couldn't hire them. Their hands were tied.

Now, the defendant makes a lot about saying that the plaintiffs, the battalion chiefs, were the right-hand man, the second in command of the fire department. And we submit to the Court that if in fact that was true, Your Honor, then why when Chief Houseman retired did neither the plaintiffs, did neither of the plaintiffs, why were neither of the plaintiffs made acting interim fire chiefs? If they were already supposedly running the day-to-day operations, if they were the right-hand man, who better to come in and take over in the interim, rather than bringing in the police chief who couldn't even participate in the rotation, who couldn't even attend and take command at an incident than the two battalion chiefs. The same, when Chief Schmaltz left the fire department, neither one was called upon to step up and act as interim chief.

So right-hand man? I don't think so, Your Honor.

It's clear that for the position of fire chief, it's not necessary to be a fire fighter. It's not necessary to be able to run into a burning building. It's not necessary to be able to attend a multi vehicle accident and assist at that point.

But for a battalion chief you have to be a fire fighter. They are fire fighters. That was their primary duty, that was their primary function, that was the role, that was

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the service that was provided by the fire department.

Everything else was solely to fight fires and to prevent fires.

I think, Your Honor, that when we are talking about whether the restrictions that were placed on them when they were on standby time, given all the testimony that was presented, there should be no doubt that they were limited in what they could do. Aside from the requirement that they not drink alcohol, they really couldn't leave a 15-minute window from anywhere in the city. They had to respond. As Chief Schmaltz testified, as both of the plaintiffs testified, and as Chief Houseman will testify, if this case is allowed to They had to respond within a certain window. And so proceed. because of that, common sense dictates that if you have to respond within a certain period of time, then you don't have the freedom to do whatever you want. You can't attend your granddaughter's graduation in the middle of Battle Creek because you don't know what parking is going to be like, you don't know how crowded it's going to be in the stadium or the auditorium. You don't know if a call is going to come in as everyone is being let out, as traffic from a thousand people is taking up the streets.

Certainly, going to dinner, something that both of their wives said that they enjoyed the weeks that they were not on-call, certainly that was a problem. Rosalee stated that she felt she was a prisoner in her own home. Mrs. Erskine said at

one point she had to get out in the middle of the street so that he could respond to a fire. And after that point they rode separately, and they both gave examples, all four of them gave examples of when they had to leave in the middle of a meal. They couldn't travel to Grand Rapids, they couldn't even travel to Kalamazoo which is close by to Battle Creek. It's basically right next door.

So they couldn't sleep well the weeks that they were on-call because they had to listen for that call, for those alerts; they had to monitor the radio; they couldn't even mow the lawn because, as was explained, even if you put it on vibrate, you might miss a call. And as plaintiff Erskine so passionately said, it's about safety. He took his job seriously. And so if that meant that he had to have all four electronic devices, which he believed were required, and which Plaintiff Holt said were required, then that's what he was going to do because his job was to fight fires and provide safety to the community.

And, Your Honor, I do not believe that given the unique circumstances of this case, given the testimony that has been presented to the Court to date, that the Court should grant their motion. The motion should be denied. This case should be allowed to move forward and ultimately the Court should find in the favor of the plaintiffs.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Alvarez. Well, under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(c) I do have the discretion in a nonjury trial to enter judgment on a claim or a defense that under controlling law can be maintained or defeated only with a favorable finding on that issue.

However, I can also decline to enter judgment at this time and wait until the close of the evidence, which I think is the more reasonable approach here.

As I said, it is a matter of my discretion either to grant the motion or deny it or to defer it. And the defendant wants judgment on the applicability of the FLSA citing the two exemptions, the executive and administrative. Also whether the overtime issue dealing with being on-call is compensable.

But it's my view that the better course for me to follow at this point is to reserve ruling on this motion until the close of all the evidence, the testimony, and the closing arguments have been before me.

So with respect to defense counsel, I am denying the motion at this time and defer it until such time as everything is complete.

So with that, Mr. Kreter, are you prepared to --

MR. KRETER: Yes, Your Honor. We are prepared --

THE COURT: -- move forward.

MR. KRETER: -- proceed. We have the, we would offer the video deposition. We have filed the transcript with the Court, but the video deposition of former Chief Larry Houseman.

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(Playing videotape, 11:14 a.m.; Videotape concluded,
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         12:31 p.m.)
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                  THE COURT: Okay. It's about 12:30. Shall we adjourn
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         to your witness at 1:30, Mr. Kreter?
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                  MR. KRETER: Yes. I believe he's probably here now or
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         1:00 o'clock. So 1:30 would be fine.
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                  THE COURT: Let's come back at 1:30.
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                  THE LAW CLERK: All rise, please. Court is in recess.
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                  MR. KRETER: Your Honor, can I ask a question?
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         that's our motion in limine witness, I suspect he will be a
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         half hour, 45 minutes at most. And I assume we will do
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         closings after that.
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                  THE COURT: Assuming that Mr. Alvarez doesn't have any
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         rebuttal.
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                  MR. ALVAREZ: I don't believe I do, Your Honor, at
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         this time. I'm going to confirm that over lunch. But, yeah, I
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         mean if yours is only going to be a half hour, my cross would
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         be maybe 15 minutes at most. So I'm not opposed to closing
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         arguments.
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                  THE COURT: Well, assuming that Mr. Alvarez doesn't
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         have rebuttal, then we will move into closing statements which
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         I am going to limit to 15 minutes apiece. I'll give
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         Mr. Alvarez an additional five to rebut, and at that point once
         I have a chance to look at my notes, I'm thinking I might very
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         well deliver a bench opinion sometime this afternoon.
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1	MR. KRETER: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.
2	THE COURT: Okay.
3	MR. ALVAREZ: Thank you.
4	THE COURT: Thank you.
5	THE LAW CLERK: Court is in recess.
6	(Recess taken, 12:32 p.m.; Resume Proceedings,
7	1:33 p.m.)
8	THE LAW CLERK: All rise, please. Court is back in
9	session. You may be seated.
10	THE COURT: Okay. Counsel, are you ready?
11	MR. KRETER: Yes, Your Honor. I would like to call
12	Russell Claggett.
13	RUSSELL CLAGGETT, DEFENSE WITNESS, WAS DULY SWORN
14	THE LAW CLERK: If you'll please state your name and
15	spell your last name for the record.
16	THE WITNESS: Russell Claggett. C-L-A-G-G-E-T-T.
17	DIRECT EXAMINATION
18	BY MR. KRETER:
19	Q Mr. Claggett, what's your current employment?
20	A I'm Assistant Superintendent for Human Resources with the
21	Calhoun Intermediate School District.
22	Q Were you ever employed by the City of Battle Creek?
23	A Yes.
24	Q When were you employed?
25	A I was employed by the City of Battle Creek from 1983 until

- 1 1995 and then from 1998 through 2014.
- Q In what capacity were you employed for the City of Battle
  Creek?
- A When I was initially hired I was an assistant city

  attorney, and did prosecution, did labor work for the city, and

  then when I came back to the city in 1998 I was hired as the

  employee relations director.
  - Q And are you licensed to practice law in the State of Michigan?
  - A I am.

- Q And were you licensed to practice law at the time you worked for the City of Battle Creek?
- A I was.
- Q What were your job duties when you returned in 1998?
  - A So I had basically two functions: I was employee relations director but I also was deputy city attorney for labor relations. So I serve as the city's chief spokesperson with our nine bargaining units, handled grievances, arbitrations, I also handled civil rights matters that the city was involved in. I was involved with police and fire pension board, was involved with civil service. Just general employee grievances and so forth. Then also managed the Human Resources Department and the Risk Management Department.
  - Q How many employees approximately were employed by the City of Battle Creek, recognizing it varies from time to time?

- A Yeah. So we were at a high of over 700 at one point but I think when I had left it was around 450, 500 employees.
  - Q Okay. And what's the management structure for the City of Battle Creek when you were there?
  - A So Battle Creek is a city manager form of government so we have a city commission, but the city manager runs the day-to-day operations of the city. There's an assistant city manager, so there's a senior staff the city manager hires directly, and then there are mid-level managers, and then rank and file employees.
  - Q Can you list some of the senior staff?
  - A So senior staff would be the city manager, assistant city manager, my position, the director of employee relations, city attorney, finance director, police chief, fire chief, the director of the recreation department. Those are who I remember at this point.
  - Q Can you list some of the mid-level management?
  - A So mid-level managers would have been like our city clerk, our city assessor, the city income tax administrator, our captains and lieutenants in the police department, our battalion chiefs in the fire department, those types of positions.
  - Q Were the mid-level managers part of the management team?
- 24 A Yes.

25 Q And would there be meetings with the mid-level managers and

the senior staff of Battle Creek? 1 Yes, there would be. 2 Okay. And would the battalion chiefs attend those 3 Q meetings? 4 Yes. Α 5 Okay. Were the battalion chiefs considered part of the 6 Q management team for the City of Battle Creek? 7 Yes, they were. 8 Α We have, I don't think I need to show it to you because you 9 negotiated it, but Joint Exhibit Number 1 is a 15-year contract 10 with the battalion chiefs that was executed 2007. Were you 11 involved in that? 12 I was. 13 Α And the book in front of you is Defendant's Exhibits, and 14 Exhibits A, B and C are notes in the back which I believe were 15 made by you. Can you take a second to review that? Were those 16 notes made by you? 17 Yes, they were. Α 18 And they were made during the course of bargaining? 19 Q 20 Α Yes. Who negotiated the 15-year contract with the battalion 21 chiefs on behalf of the city? 22 23 So I served as chief spokesperson for the city, but they -the fire chief was also part of the bargaining team, the 24 finance director, and I believe it was at the time the

assistant city manager.

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- Q Okay. Do you recall who served on the negotiating team for the battalion chiefs?
- A The entire bargaining unit. So there were two people in the bargaining unit and Mark Lindaur and Richard Haworth.
  - Q What was the purpose behind this 15-year agreement, the battalion chiefs?
- So the purpose was to really help them understand that they Α were part of the management team. We were transitioning from a situation where we had at one point four battalion chiefs that were all 24-hour on/48-hour off employees to a situation where we had two battalion chiefs, both of them would be 40-hour employees and worked Monday through Friday. So we were bringing them into the management fold. The contract that we negotiated in 2007 brought them into our mid-level manager pay range, I think it was Grade 11. I think there were 14 or 15 grades in our pay scale at that point. So we tied their wages to what happened as far as any adjustments with the non represented group. We tied their health insurance to whatever adjustments were made with the non represented group. really took away some of the big issues that you normally engage in when you're in bargaining. And so to provide some stability for both them and for the city, we negotiated a 15-year agreement.
- Q Was it important that they be part of the management team

at that point? 1 Α Absolutely. 2 Okay. You said there was a transition. Do you know why 3 O there was a transition from the 24/48/53 to the 40-hour 4 standby? 5 So part of it was just looking at how we were managing the 6 fire department. From our perspective it was almost archaic to 7 still have a manager who would, who would be there and sleeping 8 with the fire fighters. We wanted them to realize, the fire 9 fighters in particular, realize that the battalion chiefs were 10 not part of their bargaining unit. They were part of the 11 management team. And so we structured them to look exactly 12 like all of our other managers. 13 And in fact do you know if they had responsibilities like 14 all of your other managers? 15 Yes, they did. 16 Α And was standby an issue that was discussed during your 17 O negotiations? 18 It was. 19 Α And just briefly, what discussions did you have? 20 Q So for the bargaining unit, it was, it was a major issue. 21 I think my notes reflect that. You know, on-call was a big 22 23 issue. And for us it was important to try to help them with the transition to the management team, and also recognize that, 24 you know, in Battle Creek we are essentially a closed system 25

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### RUSSELL CLAGGETT - DIRECT EXAMINATION - MR. KRETER

when it comes to promotion within the fire department. can't go and post a battalion chief position and hire from the outside because of our civil service system. We have to hire from inside. So we were willing to make some concessions on this extra pay for standby so that the position would still be attractive to a 53-hour employee coming to a 40-hour work week. So you referred to extra pay not overtime. So was Q extra pay a stipend? Right. It's a stipend for being in a standby status. Α Okay. Do you know if the battalion chiefs with this contract made less, more, same amount of money than before this 15-year contract? So they made more from a base salary standpoint because now they were, I mean we looked at where their current wage fell, is around 68,000, which fell within the wage range for our group 11. And then we tied future wage increases to whatever the non represented employees got. I know non represented employees did receive pay increases after 2007, so their compensation did increase. Do you know if there is a functional reason in the Q operation of the fire department why this was being negotiated? In other words, why this arrangement was beneficial to the fire department and its operation? So I know in talking with the chief, one of the big reasons was to make a clear demarcation between the rank and file fire

fighter group and the administrative team. And so by having them be on a 40-hour work week, they were just like the chief; they were part, I mean they are called battalion chiefs, right, so it sent a clear message to the rank and file that they were part of the administrative team. We also gave them specific duties. I believe one of them was the administrative battalion chief and the other was the suppression battalion chief. And they had specific duties related to training and other matters.

- Q And you successfully negotiated a contract.
- A Yes.

- Q Okay. Did you in your capacity do any analysis regarding whether this was in compliance with FLSA?
- A I did.
- Q And what analysis did you do?

A So I reviewed I believe it's Section 13A1 of the Fair Labor Standards Act, had conversations with our bargaining team, with Chief Houseman, and also the city manager would have been involved in those discussions. But understood that all employees are considered eligible for overtime unless they fit one of the exemptions. So we looked at what exemptions did they fit. We believe they fit both the executive and administrative exemptions for overtime and minimum wage. They met the base wage, I mean the base wage is \$24,000 a year, so they were making 68. But we also looked at what their duties and responsibilities were. So they were responsible for

running the day-to-day operations of the fire department, they were responsible for training, they were responsible for staffing in the morning. So if we had to move fire fighters around because somebody called in sick, or something else happened, they were responsible for managing the work force.

They also would handle day-to-day complaints, concerns from employees. They also would play a role in the disciplinary process. Another important role that they played, because we were a civil service organization, prior to this contract we had language that said when there was a vacancy in the battalion chief position we had to select the top candidate. So once an individual took the test, if they were the top they got the job. We changed the negotiated language with the fire fighters bargaining unit so that we could have one of the top three candidates, and so the battalion chiefs played a role, a significant role, in advising us on who among those top three candidates would be the best fit for the organization to move forward as the battalion chief.

#### BY MR. KRETER:

- Q And were these policies followed during the rest of your tenure at Battle Creek?
- A Yes.

- Q Did you take into consideration that they were incident commanders at a fire scene?
- A Absolutely.

If you had believed there was a violation of FLSA would you 1 Q have recommended the City of Battle Creek adopt that agreement? 2 No, I would not. 3 Α Okay. And are you aware that under the law FLSA rights Q 4 cannot be waived? 5 Α I am. 6 MR. KRETER: I don't have any further questions, Your 7 Honor. 8 THE COURT: Thank you very much. 9 10 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. ALVAREZ: 11 Mr. Claggett, were any -- you said there were two members 12 of the bargaining unit for battalion chiefs that were, that 13 negotiated the contract at that time. Correct? 14 Yeah, there were only two people in the bargaining unit, so 15 both members were at the table. 16 So there were only two battalion chiefs at the time? 17 Q Yes. Α 18 Okay. Were either one of those the plaintiffs? 19 Q 20 Α No. Okay. Were either one of those individuals that negotiated 21 O this contract an attorney? 22 23 Α Not to my knowledge, no. And they didn't have an attorney representing them during 24 Q those negotiations, correct? 25

- A They did not have an attorney at the table. But I believe they consulted with an attorney by the name of Ron Helveston.
  - Q But he wasn't there when it was being negotiated, correct?
- 4 A He was not at the table, no.
- Q Okay. Take a look at your notes. Exhibit A. You

  mentioned that you didn't consider those hours that were being

  negotiated outside of the normal schedule as overtime hours.

You called them extra pay, right, or extra hours?

A Right.

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- 10 Q But your notes they clearly say OT.
- 11 A Right.
- 12 Q What does OT stand for?
- A So that's how it was presented to me from the bargaining union. They were claiming it was an overtime issue.
  - Q Okay. And then if you go to Exhibit B, the second page of your notes in Exhibit B, it comes up again. It says one hour of OT, does OT mean overtime?
  - A Yes.
    - Q So one hour of overtime, that's what your notes were for. So they understood it to be overtime. Whether you understood it to be something different, you're saying this was a term that they were using, correct?
    - A They, I don't remember everything from 12 years ago at the bargaining table. I'm sorry.
- Q But that's what we have your notes for.

Right. So my recollection is that for the city, the issue 1 Α 2 was the on-call pay. They in the previous contract had gotten overtime, and one hour of overtime equaled their current pay. 3 We were converting that to what we call the on-call pay. 4 Thank you. Can you go to the Joint Exhibit book? Yes, can 5 you go to the Joint Exhibit book? Should be on your right. 6 And if you would go to Exhibit Number 1 which is the collective 7 bargaining agreement with the OSP that we are discussing. Ιf 8 you go to page 4 under article 6. To be clear, this collective 9 bargaining agreement, this Exhibit 1, Joint Exhibit 1 is the 10 11 collective bargaining agreement that was reached between the city and the OSP? 12 Correct. 13 Α Okay. So looking at article 6 under wages, Section 6.3. 14 Q What is the heading of that section? 15 It says overtime pay. 16 Α It doesn't say extra pay, doesn't say extra hours, it says 17 0 overtime pay, correct? 18 Yes. 19 Α So anyone reading this, who especially are not attorneys, 20 Q who had already indicated that they saw those extra hours from 21 your perspective as being overtime, that's what they would look 22 23 at, that's, that's how they would reference this. I don't know how they would reference it. I know what the 24 language says. 25

But the -- but it says overtime pay, right? 1 Q Α The heading is overtime pay, yes. 2 Who drafted this agreement? Who actually typed it out? 3 O wasn't the two members that were sitting there from the 4 bargaining? 5 No, it would have been a joint effort where I think my 6 office would have drafted. Some of this language changed from 7 the previous contract. But not all of it. So --8 So your office would have drafted the agreement, the two 9 other members would have reviewed it and okayed it, made any 10 suggested changes? 11 Correct. 12 Α Can you go to in that same book, can you go to Exhibit 2, 13 0 so Joint Exhibit 2? Can you flip to the second page on the 14 index? What's the heading under article Section 6.2? 15 It says overtime pay. 16 Α And can you please flip to Section 6.2 and the heading of 17 0 that section? 18 Standby pay. 19 Α Now, as I understand it, any hours under either agreement, 20 Q any hours that one of the members works outside of their 21 40 hours, and I'm not talking about when they are on standby, I 22 23 understand they have a stipend for that, but when they actually did respond when they had to show up and actually do something, 24 they were compensated at a rate of time and a half, correct? 25

- A Not any time they showed up, so it was only, my understanding was only if there was an emergency situation.
  - Q If they put it on their time card, they would?
  - A That I don't know. I know what the language said was that if they were called back for an emergency situation, then they received extra compensation and we paid them time and a half of their regular rate.
  - Q And time and a half of a regular rate is under the FLSA considered what?
  - A It's the standard for overtime pay.

- Q Thank you. Now, you mentioned after being asked that one of the reasons that you switched to this was more functional, that they, from the 24/48 to the 40-hour work week, was because it was more functional for the fire department, correct?
- A Right. That's what the fire chief wanted for his administration.
- Q Yeah. Because you said it was too archaic to have a manager because you considered the battalion chiefs management at that point to be sleeping at the fire house with the fire fighters, correct?
- A Yes, that was one of the issues.
- Q But you know that right now they have gone back to that archaic system, right now the battalion chiefs do sleep at the fire house again.
- A I didn't know that.

- Q Isn't it true that as Chief Houseman testified earlier that in fact one of the main reasons was budget wise. Kelloggs had just left the City of Kalamazoo (sic), and there was a downturn in the economy. Is that correct?
  - A During what time period are you talking about? When we negotiated the 2007 agreement?
  - Q Yes.

- A So I know from a budget standpoint we were looking for coverage during the week and so that is my understanding why we went to the 40-hour positions. We already had one I believe prior to that time, and we made then two. We already had gone from having four battalion chiefs to two. So I mean I know the city had some budget issues towards the end of my career. I mean we did have a point where staff didn't get a pay increase, there were some furloughs for staff during one year. I don't remember what year it was. I don't remember if it was during 2007 or not, no.
- Q That's fine. But at the time there were only two battalion chiefs when this system was enacted, correct?
- A Yes.
- Q So under that system those two battalion chiefs would have had to work alternating weeks with the chief on that standby system, correct?
- A I'm not exactly sure how that worked.
- $\mathbb{I}$  Q Okay. Did the city save money by going from the 24/48

## RUSSELL CLAGGETT - CROSS EXAMINATION - MR. ALVAREZ

system to this new standby system?

A I honestly couldn't tell you if there was a savings. I just don't know.

Q Well, let's think about this math wise. If you have two people, well, three people that are alternating and working 24-hour days, seven days a week, but you're only paying them for 40, plus a few hours here and there that they show up to an emergency at time and a half, versus paying them for the entire 24 hours for seven days a week, there's a big difference in the amount of money that's being paid out, correct?

MR. KRETER: Your Honor, I'm going to object to the question because it doesn't take into consideration all the factors such as Mr. Claggett testified the battalion chiefs got increases.

THE COURT: I agree with defense counsel, Mr. Alvarez. I think that, number one, I think it's a little unfair to the witness, but number two, I think that it lacks a sufficient foundation for him to be able to draw any conclusions. I think, I don't think there's anybody in this courtroom except maybe the finance person from the city who has the math skills with that limited amount of information to answer that question with any degree of reliability. So the objection is sustained.

MR. ALVAREZ: Thank you, Your Honor.

#### BY MR. ALVAREZ:

Q You said when you -- because you're an attorney, correct?

#### RUSSELL CLAGGETT - CROSS EXAMINATION - MR. ALVAREZ

- 1 A Yes.
- Q And you were an attorney then when this agreement was being
- 3 negotiated?
- 4 A Yes.
- 5 Q And you said that what you did to determine whether the
- positions of battalion chief were exempt from overtime was you
- 7 reviewed the statute.
- 8 A Correct.
- 9 Q Okay. That was all you did, right, you reviewed the
- statute, you compared the statute and the exemptions outlined
- in the statute with what you were being told the duties were of
- the battalion chiefs?
- 13 A So what I recall is not only looking at the statute but
- 14 | there are also quidelines. We had a Fair Labor Standard
- 15 | handbook series in our Human Resources office. I also
- referenced that. So I mean that's what I remember doing.
- 17 Q Okay. You didn't go to Westlaw or Lexis and look up any
- cases, did you?
- 19 A I don't remember if I did or not. I couldn't --
- 21 A I don't believe we did, no.
- 22 Q And did you do an evaluation every year to see if they
- still remained exempt?
- 24 A I don't recall doing that, no.
- 25 Q Okay. Because this was a fairly new system, right, going

to this week on/week off standby system was new. 1 Α Again --2 To the City of Battle Creek. 3 0 I don't know about the week on/week off. I don't know how Α 4 they operated the standby piece. So I can't --5 But they weren't doing it before because they were on the 6 24/48-hour system. Correct? 7 I think one of them was. I'm not sure about the 40-hour Α 8 battalion chief, if that person also may have responded to 9 emergencies, et cetera, so I'm not positive on that. 10 So after this agreement was implemented, neither you or 11 anyone at the city, or at least not you that you know of, did a 12 reevaluation of what was actually being done during that 13 standby time and whether it met the exemption standards of the 14 FLSA, correct? 15 So I never did a formal review. But I knew what existed 16 when we made, when we entered into the collective bargaining 17 agreement, and I was not aware of any changes once we made that 18 decision. 19 20 MR. ALVAREZ: Thank you. Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Any redirect? 21 MR. KRETER: No, Your Honor. 22 23 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Claggett. Thank you for your testimony. You're excused. Mr. Kreter. 24 MR. KRETER: Your Honor, we have no more witnesses so 25

I would ask that Mr. Claggett be excused as a witness 1 so that he can remain in the courtroom. 2 THE COURT: Sure. Mr. Alvarez, any objections? 3 MR. ALVAREZ: No objections, Your Honor. 4 THE COURT: Any rebuttal, Mr. Alvarez? 5 MR. ALVAREZ: No, Your Honor. 6 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Let's commence with 7 closing arguments. And keep in mind, if you would, please, 8 that I have been taking copious notes. I think that I am 9 relatively conversant in your arguments, and it is not 10 necessary for my purposes that you be exhaustive in your 11 arguments, but only that you, shall we say, hit the high 12 points. Okay. 13 MR. ALVAREZ: Your Honor, I will be 14 uncharacteristically brief. 15 THE COURT: If only. 16 MR. ALVAREZ: And in the spirit of brevity, Your 17 Honor, I will simply request to incorporate my response to the 18 directed verdict motion into this closing and focus on just a 19 couple of things. 20 With regard to the testimony that we heard today from 21 Chief Houseman, I would like the Court to note that he did 22 23 indicate that the first reason that he mentioned for the change was that there were financial constraints. That it was because 24

the city was in an economic downturn because Kellogg had left,

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and that this was a way to save money. Because the city was having financial issues.

And even though Chief Houseman did say a couple of times that he did not, that there was no expectation from him that the radio be monitored, contrary to what Mr. Holt has testified to was a directive given to him by Chief Houseman, Chief Houseman did testify that he did have with him pretty much at all times even when he was mowing the lawn his radio because he was monitoring it. And I believe he even mentioned that he had some sort of monitor or scanner that was on at all times.

So he may have said that it wasn't his expectations, but the reality was that he was monitoring the radio, and it lends credibility to Mr. Holt, Mr. Holt's testimony that he was instructed to also monitor the radio. Including when Mr. Erskine said in his testimony that he was called a couple of times by the chief who had been monitoring the radio when he was on standby.

In fact, Chief Houseman said that monitoring the radio was a part of the job. That was his testimony, and that he expected them to respond 24/7. Chief Houseman did testify that he believed but wasn't sure that he had changed the directives to have a four-man fire engine, but, and Mr. Holt's testimony, I mean Mr. Erskine's testimony when we reviewed the CBA with the local fire fighters union, it specifically stated that

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there was a three-man fire engine, thereby making a responding battalion chief a member of the two-in/two-out rule.

And, Your Honor, one final note that I know I've reiterated this many times but I want to be very clear for the That if it walks like a duck and it talks like a duck, it has to be battalion chief. In this case we have had exhaustive testimony not just from the plaintiffs but from Chief Schmaltz and Chief Houseman about the fact that when they were on standby time, during that period of time between 2012 and 2015, they were working. They were required or permitted They were required to actively monitor or listen to the radio, to the alarm, and they never knew when a call was going to come in, whether at 6:00 o'clock in the evening, in the middle of dinner, or at 3:00 o'clock in the morning. They're engaged to wait. They were not waiting That's work. to be engaged. They are engaged to wait at that point. And though the defendant is arquing that they're exempt because they're supervisors, executive, or administratively exempt, the factor remains, Your Honor, that for either one of those tests, you have to consider what the primary duty was, and as I mentioned earlier in my response to the motion for directed verdict, the primary duty of a battalion chief is to respond to fires. And they did. And they even put out fires. And they responded to multiple vehicle accidents. They had to have their gear. They had to have their radios. And, yes, maybe

they didn't carry a self-contained breathing apparatus but it was on the engines. So just like anyone else, they could have grabbed one and jumped in.

Most I think noteworthy is the fact that not anyone can be a battalion chief. Chief Houseman, Chief Schmaltz, they both said, you have to be a fire fighter. You have to have the training. Chief Hampton cannot participate in the rotation because he was not a fire fighter. He didn't have the training. So apparently anyone can be a fire chief, but you need to be a fire fighter to be a battalion chief.

And I think that goes to the heart of their defense, Your Honor. That if the primary duty, if everything else that is a part of their functions, that is a part of their job description falls to one side, the minute that siren goes off, the minute that radio goes off, the minute a call comes in, then that's the primary function. Because we are not talking about widget, we are not talking about selling services, we are talking about saving lives. And as Mr. Holt testified, time is of the essence. Every minute counts. And that's why they have to be fire fighters to be battalion chiefs.

And that's why, Your Honor, we request this Court find in favor of the plaintiffs, find that they were working overtime, that the hours that they spent during the standby time was work that should have been compensated, that they were not exempt under either the executive or the administrative and

that they be compensated for that time at a rate of time and a half.

And as to liquidated damages, I do not believe that the defendants have provided sufficient evidence to counter that almost mandatory requirement of liquidated damages.

Mr. Claggett testified that he looked at the statute, looked at a desk book that he had on FLSA when they were negotiating the agreement. He did no additional research. He sought no additional opinions.

THE COURT: Well, he said he didn't remember if he did, Mr. Alvarez. Let's be fair to him.

MR. ALVAREZ: Sure. So he said he didn't remember. You would think something as important as that he would have remembered.

THE COURT: That was a long time ago. Good heavens, it's more than ten years ago.

MR. ALVAREZ: Your Honor, he remembered many other details, Your Honor. But that's fine. Either way, he said that he didn't believe that he did any other assessment after the contract went into implementation. So from 2007 until 2015, well, until he was no longer working for the department, I can't remember what date that was, he does not believe that they did any further assessment. So how could he recommend that the city pay or compensate for those hours if there was no future, no further assessment done?

And so, Your Honor, on that basis, plaintiff rests.

THE COURT: Thank you very much, Mr. Alvarez.
Mr. Kreter, closing please.

MR. KRETER: Thank you, Your Honor. Couple quick points. One, we believe Mr. Claggett's testimony is sufficient to prove good faith. Two, good faith is separate from a willful violation. Willful violation extends the period from two years to three years. There has been no evidence whatsoever of any willful violation, and that Mr. Alvarez did not even make comment in his final argument about willful violation. So certainly we got down there, that claim should absolutely be dismissed.

I'm going to go right back to where I think this case is. It's these are exempt employees. I said at the beginning of trial yesterday: Manage, lead and direct were the key words. I've got two key words: Primary duty. If you look at the elements of executive, the first element, whether plaintiffs's primary duty is management in the Battle Creek Fire Department. If we go to administrative, the first element in dispute, whether plaintiffs's primary duty was the performance of office or nonmanual work directly related to management or general business operations of the Battle Creek Fire Department. If we go to the final element that's in dispute is whether plaintiffs's primary duty included the exercise of discretion, independent judgment, and respect to

matters of significance.

All I heard for a day and a half from plaintiff are exceptions to the rule. The exception they had to respond to a, to an automobile accident on I-94 which we have covered. It was a 192-car pileup. The exception that they had to respond to I think a barrel fire and then a cement mixer fire. That's all we heard. Those exceptions do not become their primary duty. And the fact that they are able to fight a fire and carry some gear with them in the event of a catastrophic situation that does not make that their primary duty.

I think the testimony of Chief Houseman was compelling that they managed, lead, and direct. And he relied on them.

Chief Schmaltz said the same thing.

I think it's also important to note that what I feel are the three key witnesses for us, Chief Schmaltz, we didn't call him, Chief Houseman, and Mr. Claggett, all no longer work for the city. They don't have any, as the expression, skin in the game anymore. They have, they are telling it to the best of their ability. They're testifying to the best of their recollection as to what actually happened.

And all three witnesses support that these were part, these battalion chiefs were part of the management team. They had discretion, they had important roles and functions, and they ran the day-to-day operations of the Battle Creek Fire Department which consisted of 75 to 90 people.

And finally, most importantly, the most important activity that they do, they drop everything if there's a fire, all stations fire, they go to the scene, and they control the scene. They apply everything they know. Every protocol that the Battle Creek Fire Department has developed, their experience, their intuitiveness, whatever it takes, they're in charge of the scene. They manage, lead, and direct. And I think that is decisive in finding that both Mr. Holt and Mr. Erskine are exempt.

I'm not going to address standby. I addressed it earlier. I know Your Honor is well aware of our position with standby and whether it's onerous. I would only say that both chiefs supported our position that is not onerous when they provided testimony.

And, therefore, we would ask that the Court dismiss plaintiffs's case in toto.

THE COURT: Thank you very much, Mr. Kreter. Any rebuttal?

MR. ALVAREZ: Very brief, Your Honor. Defendant states that those times when they had to respond to an emergency situation was the exception to the rule. The problem, Your Honor, is that the rule was also that a fire fighter had to respond to those emergency calls. Chief Hampton, acting Chief Hampton couldn't respond, the current acting chief can't respond because they are not fire fighters.

As far as them being considered part of the management team, if that's true, and if they really were the right-hand man of the fire chief, why wasn't it that no battalion chief in this entire time has been stepped up to act as a fire chief in the interim? Even now they pull in the Chief of Police to manage the fire department.

As far as their primary duty, Your Honor, if we are going to go based on exactly everything that they are doing during the day, then, Your Honor, fire fighters, as Chief Houseman testified to, for the most part are cleaning, mopping, and doing other chores at the fire house. Does that make them house keepers? No. They're fire fighters. Exactly like the battalion chiefs.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. Thank you all. I am going to take about a half an hour and I am going to then come back and I'm going to give you my ruling in this case. First I have to collect my notes. So I'll be back here about quarter of 3:00 if anybody wants to hear what I have to say. We are adjourned until then.

THE LAW CLERK: All rise, please. Court is in recess.

(Recess taken, 2:21 p.m.; Resume Proceedings,
2:59 p.m.)

THE LAW CLERK: All rise, please. Court is now in session. You may be seated.

THE COURT: What follows is my bench opinion in case number 1:15cr931, Howard Holt and Martin Erskine versus the City of Battle Creek.

This matter was tried to the Court on August 22nd and 23, 2018 on plaintiffs's claims against the defendant, City of Battle Creek, for unpaid wages, compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act, FLSA, 20 U.S.C. 201 et seq. The Court has carefully reviewed the facts to which the parties stipulated at the final pretrial conference on August 13, 2018, the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law the parties submitted before trial, and the testimony and exhibits admitted at trial.

This opinion contains the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a).

The Court determines that the City of Battle Creek is entitled to a judgment in its favor as follows:

Findings of fact: Plaintiffs Howard Holt and Martin Erskine served as battalion chiefs for the defendant, City of Battle Creek's Fire Department. Holt was employed as one of the Battle Creek Fire Department -- I'll refer to that as BCFD going forward, battalion chiefs from November 20, 2007, until his voluntary retirement on February 13, 2015.

Erskine has been continuously employed as one of the Battle Creek Fire Department's battalion chiefs since June 8, 2012.

From April 2013 to July 2014, plaintiffs were the only two battalion chiefs in the fire department. Battle Creek developed a detailed job description for the position of battalion chief for the relevant time period at issue.

Battle Creek also issued a departmental directive concerning the position of battalion chief including the positions of administrative battalion chief, the position held by Erskine, and suppression battalion chief, the position held by Holt. Within the Battle Creek Fire Department, battalion chiefs were second in chain of command behind the chief, but ahead of captains, lieutenants, and fire fighters respectively. The City of Battle Creek has approximately 75 to 90 members of the fire department.

Chief Larry Houseman was fire chief for the BCFD from 1997 through April 26, 2013. Chief Jackie Hampton was fire chief of the BCFD from April 26, 2013, through January 31, 2014. Chief Arthur David Schmaltz was fire chief for BCFD from approximately February 1, 2014, through the time period during which the standby system was in place.

For all relevant time periods, plaintiffs's work week was 40 hours. Plaintiffs allege that as part of their duties and responsibilities, they were required to be on standby duty or standby status for certain periods of time during their employment.

Under the standby system, which was in place until

May 1, 2015, standby began at 5:00 p.m. and continued until 8:00 a.m. the following morning. Standby generally rotated every seven days. Through Chief Houseman's tenure as fire chief, he rotated standby with the two battalion chiefs, including plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs were on standby approximately once every three weeks until May 1, 2013.

Chief Hampton was unable to be on standby, therefore, from May 1, 2013, through July 1, 2014, plaintiffs were on standby approximately every other week. However, once Chief Schmaltz assumed the position of fire chief, and moved closer to Battle Creek, he began taking a turn on standby returning plaintiffs to approximately once every three weeks of standby time from July 1, 2014, through May 2, 2015.

While employed as battalion chiefs, plaintiffs were members of a bargaining unit represented by the Organization of Supervisory Personnel, OSP, of the Battle Creek Fire Department. In fact, Holt was the president of the organization, Erskine was the vice president. A different bargaining unit represented the other employees of the BCFD. The Organization of Supervisory Personnel in Battle Creek negotiated the terms and conditions of plaintiffs's employment, as memorialized by the parties collective bargaining agreement, CBA, dated July 1, 2007, entitled "Contract Between the City of Battle Creek and the Organization of Supervisory Personnel of

the Battle Creek Fire Department."

With regard to standby status and overtime, the parties' CBA provides the following:

Section 6.2, Standby Pay. In the event that the city requires bargaining unit members to act in a standby status, such members will be entitled to one hour of pay at one and a half times their regular rate of pay for each day spent in standby status. If the standby status occurs on a weekend or holiday, the employee shall be entitled to two hours of pay at a rate of time and one half times their regular hourly rate of pay.

Section 6.3, Overtime Pay. Employees, who are called back to duty for an emergency, as defined by the fire chief, shall receive pay for all actual hours worked at one and a half times their regular hourly rate of pay. Bargaining unit members are considered overtime exempt except for the stipend for on-call status and the stipend for emergency call-in. All other work assignments conducted after what is considered normal working hours is administrative work and shall not be subject to overtime payment.

The parties agree that "for all relevant time periods, plaintiffs each received all required standby pay contractually mandated under the CBA."

Similarly, the parties agree that "for all relevant time periods, plaintiffs each received all required overtime

pay contractually mandated under the CBA."

The CBA remained in full force and effect until April 2, 2015, when a superseding agreement was reached between Battle Creek and the OSP. "The 2015 CBA". After entering into the 2015 CBA, effective May 2, 2015, no battalion chiefs, including Erskine, were required to be on standby time for a week at a time because battalion chiefs worked shift-based schedules.

On September 12, 2015, plaintiffs initiated this case, alleging that during their standby status, they worked hours in excess of the hourly levels specified in the FLSA, and are entitled to overtime compensation at a rate of not less than one and one and a half times their regular rate of pay for the hours of overtime they have worked.

Relying on 29 U.S.C. 216(b), plaintiffs seek their unpaid wages plus an additional equal amount in liquidated statutory damages along with costs and reasonable attorney fees.

The parties were unsuccessful in their attempt to mediate a resolution of this case in May of 2016. On February 14, 2017, this Court denied defendant's motion to dismiss in favor of arbitration. On February 6, 2018, following discovery, this Court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment. On March 2, 2018, the parties participated in a settlement conference which was also not successful in

resolving this case. Last, on July 9, 2018, the parties participated in voluntary facilitative mediation which was not successful in resolving the case.

Conclusions of law. And to the extent that any of the following conclusions of law constitute findings of fact, they are hereby adopted as such.

The FLSA prohibits, for qualifying employees employment "for a work week longer than 40 hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one half times the regular rate at which he is employed." 29 U.S.C. 207(a)(1).

The parties do not dispute that at all relevant times that Battle Creek was an employer and the plaintiffs were employees of the Battle Creek within the meaning of the Act.

There are three potential issues for this Court's resolution:

First, the applicability of the two FLSA exemptions, second, in the event that neither of the exemptions applies, liability, and finally, damages.

The FLSA exemptions. The FLSA expressly does not apply to "any employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity." 29 U.S.C. 213(a)(1).

An exemption is an affirmative defense and an employer seeking to assert one "must establish through 'clear and

affirmative evidence' that the employee meets every requirement of the exemption." Hughes versus Gulf Interstate Field Services, Inc., 878 F.3d 183 at 188, Sixth Circuit 2017, citations omitted.

In April 2018, the Supreme Court rejected the principle that exemptions to the FLSA should be "narrowly" construed. Encino Motorcars, LLC versus Navarro, 138 Supreme Court, 1134 at 1142, 2018.

The Supreme Court reasoned that "because the FLSA gives no textual indication that its exemptions should be construed narrowly, there is no reason to give them anything other than a fair rather than a narrow interpretation." Id.

Defendant argues that plaintiffs's FLSA claim must fail because plaintiffs are exempt from the Act's coverage under either the "executive" or "administrative" exemptions of the act. To the act. The Court agrees.

The executive exemption. The Secretary of the Department of Labor promulgates rules to govern whether an employee qualifies for a particular exemption. The parties agree that under the governing regulation, 29 CFR 541.100, an employee falls within the executive exemption where the following four requirements are met: (1) the employee receives a salary of not less than \$445 each week, (2), the employee's primary duty, I'm sorry, (2), the employee's "primary duty is management of the enterprise" of the employer. (3), the

employee "customarily or regularly directs the work of two or more employees", and (4), the employee "has the authority to hire or fire other employees or whose suggestions and recommendations as to hiring, firing, advancement, promotion, or any other change of status of other employees are given particular weight."

Only the second and fourth elements are at issue in this case. Whether plaintiffs's primary duty is management of the enterprise, and whether plaintiffs have authority to hire, or fire other employees, or whose suggestions and recommendations as to hiring, firing, advancement, promotion, or any other change of status of other employees are given particular weight.

Relevant to plaintiffs's "primary duty", defendants submitted that plaintiffs's duties and responsibilities as battalion chiefs are executive in nature as evidenced by the job description developed by Battle Creek. See the Defendant's Exhibit G, the relevant Standard Operating Procedures developed by the fire department, and the expectations and directives of acting fire chiefs. Specifically, plaintiffs were required to directly supervise lower-ranking officers and personnel, evaluate personnel, administer and enforce department policy, and coordinate the day-to-day operations of the department. Despite some selective quotes highlighted by plaintiffs's counsel in an attempt to emphasize similarity, the job

descriptions of the battalion chiefs in comparison to the job descriptions of the fire captains and lieutenants were in fact quite different. See Joint Exhibits 5 and 6 and Plaintiff's Exhibit 5 and 6. A point further explicated by Russell Claggett, who was formerly employed by Battle Creek as its director of employee relations.

The testimony of Chief Houseman and plaintiff Holt was clear that the work of the fire department is to suppress fires and the primary duty of the battalion chiefs was to "take charge" and operate as "the incident commanders at the scene of a fire."

Chief Houseman testified that fire chiefs and battalion chiefs were not counted within the "two-in/two-out" rule. The fire chief and battalion chiefs dress differently from the fire fighters, per Standard Operating Procedure. See Defendant's Exhibit T. The battalion chiefs were separate and apart from the bargaining unit that bargained on behalf of the fire fighters and other personnel, and per the director of employee relations, Claggett, were more highly compensated from a "base salary standpoint".

Chief Schmaltz and Chief Houseman both testified that plaintiff Holt was "in charge" of all suppression personnel and plaintiff Erskine was "in charge" or "oversaw" the training division. Approximately 27 lieutenants and captains directly reported to plaintiff Holt who monitored their adherence to

standards. Moreover, Chief Houseman testified that if any fire fighter "had a problem" he or she would take it to plaintiff Holt.

Both Chief Schmaltz and Chief Houseman described the management of the department as a "team effort" by fire chiefs and the battalion chiefs.

Chief Schmaltz referred to plaintiffs as "his senior staff".

Defendant's Exhibit II contains e-mails from Chief Schmaltz asking for input from the battalion chiefs, Re, fire department standard operating procedures, and Chief Houseman similarly testified to discussing operating procedures with plaintiffs.

Chief Schmaltz testified that he did not use the phrase "standby system" but instead called it the "duty chief system". Indeed, plaintiffs characterize themselves in a June 4, 2014, letter to Chief Schmaltz as members of the fire department "management". Defendant's Exhibit R.

Chief Houseman and plaintiff Holt both testified that part of the battalion chief job was to set forth for the department "what they hoped would transpire during the day".

Plaintiff Holt agreed that the battalion chiefs oversaw the department to make sure it was running smoothly on a day-to-day basis. Plaintiff Holt characterized himself as the "go between" between the city and/or the fire chief.

Although he testified that fire fighters, in practice, often went around him because of the city's open door policy.

Plaintiff Holt testified that Chief Hampton, who was responsible for not only the fire department but also the police department, was a "hands off" chief. Plaintiff Holt testified that Chief Hampton relied on plaintiffs to run the day-to-day operations of the fire department. "If anything big pops up, let me know."

Last, Director of Employee Relations Claggett also explained how battalion chiefs were made part of the "management team" for the City of Battle Creek.

The Court concludes that defendant established through clear and affirmative evidence that the plaintiffs's primary duty as battalion chiefs is "management of the fire department".

Regarding the second requirement, authority re, hiring, firing, advancement and promotion, and change in status, plaintiff Holt testified that battalion chiefs do not have the ability to hire, fire or suspend fire fighters.

However, Chief Houseman testified that plaintiff Holt was the person who was responsible for oral and written disciplinary proceedings of the fire fighters, and that Holt issued the "majority" of the discipline in the department. Chief Houseman testified that he gave "a lot of weight" to plaintiff Holt's recommendation, that he did "not operate in a vacuum".

Chief Houseman also specifically testified that plaintiff Erskine, the administrative battalion chief, was responsible for managing vacation and "Kelly days" in the department.

Similarly, Chief Schmaltz testified that while the battalion chiefs could not hire, fire, or suspend fire fighters, he would use the battalion chiefs's recommendations. He testified that he specifically requested plaintiffs's input concerning personnel decisions. Indeed, plaintiff Holt conducted employee evaluations. An October 23, 2014, e-mail from Chief Schmaltz to plaintiff Holt within Defendant's Exhibit HH delineates 13 evaluations for which Holt was then responsible. Plaintiffs were provided with the various eligibility lists established by the Civil Service Commission for entry level fire fighters, and per Claggett, plaintiffs played a "significant role" in advising the city on who among the top candidates would be the best for the organization.

The Court concludes that the defendant established through clear and affirmative evidence that plaintiffs also meet the last requirement of the executive exemption: That their suggestions and recommendations as to hiring, firing, advancement, promotion or any other change of status of other employees were given "particular weight".

Therefore, giving the executive exemption a fair interpretation, the Court concludes that plaintiffs fall within

the executive exemption from the FLSA's overtime compensation obligation.

The administrative exemption. The second FLSA exemption at issue is for individuals "employed in a bona fide administrative capacity". 29 U.S.C. 213(a)(1).

The parties agree that an employee working in a bona fide administrative capacity is someone, (1), compensated on a salary or fee basis at a rate of not less than \$455 per week; (2), whose primary duty is the performance of office or nonmanual work directly related to the management or general business operations of the employer, or the employer's customers, and (3), whose primary duty includes the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance. 29 CFR 541.200(a).

Only the second and third requirements are in dispute:
Whether "plaintiffs's primary duty is the performance of office
or nonmanual work directly related to the management or general
business operation of the employer or the employer's
customers," and whether their "primary duty includes the
exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to
matters of significance."

Plaintiff Holt testified that he was "always a fire fighter", and that his job included responding to calls related to fire or medical emergencies which required manual work.

However, drawing from the BCFD Incident Command Procedure,

Defendant's Exhibit P, defendant demonstrated that plaintiffs's primary duty was in fact work other than physically fighting fires, i.e., nonmanual work. Specifically, plaintiff Holt testified that battalion chiefs generally remain in their cars during an incident, that the battalion chief's car is "command central" at the fire scene. Plaintiff Holt testified that battalion chiefs would not put on their fire gear unless they were getting out of their car. Plaintiff Holt agreed that his duty was to evaluate the situation, receive input from the fire crew, provide tactical objectives, and review and revise the incident accident plan as needed, i.e., nonmanual work.

Indeed, plaintiff Holt conceded that when a fire crew was on the scene, he "probably never" physically suppressed a fire as a battalion chief.

During his deposition Chief Houseman, whom the Court found to be very credible, was specifically, also specifically described the battalion chief's job as to "manage, lead, and direct". He specifically rejected the proposition that the battalion chief's primary work was either "manual" or "physical".

Chief Houseman emphasized that while trained as fire fighters, battalion chief's job description did not include fighting fires.

Therefore, the Court concludes that the defendant established through clear and affirmative evidence that

plaintiffs's primary duty was the performance of nonmanual work directly related to the management of the fire department.

Turning to the next element, whether plaintiffs's primary duty included the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to "matters of significance". Plaintiff Holt testified that the battalion chiefs did not exercise discretion. For example, plaintiff Holt testified that he "ran everything through Chief Houseman" who was a "hands on chief". Plaintiff Holt testified that even under Chief Schmaltz, Holt had "very little authority".

Plaintiff Holt testified that he had "no power to buy anything" and pointed to an e-mail he sent to Chief Schmaltz with price quotes. Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. Plaintiff Holt testified that he did not have the authority to transfer fire fighters and pointed to an e-mail he sent to Chief Schmaltz to find out "if he wanted me to ask for more volunteers".

Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. Plaintiff Holt testified that he could not tell a fire fighter he could not take a vacation day.

However, defendant demonstrated that plaintiffs exercised independent judgment and discretion in accomplishing their duties even if the ultimate decision maker was the fire chief.

Significantly, Chief Schmaltz testified that plaintiffs were his "right hand men", that he allowed them to exercise "independent judgment" and gave them "latitude to make

decisions". Chief Houseman similarly praised plaintiffs for their work ethic and opined that he gave them latitude to perform their jobs. Plaintiff Holt agreed that his duty was to independently evaluate an incident with input from the fire crew, provide tactical objectives, and review and revise the incident action plan as needed within his discretion.

Plaintiff Holt agreed with the Court's questioning that he was "in charge" of the scene and that he, the person who bore the ultimate responsibility, would take the blame for anything that went wrong.

Last, the evidence and the Court's analysis of the evidence in support of plaintiffs's management responsibilities described earlier also applies here. The Court concludes that defendant also established the last requirement through clear and affirmative evidence that plaintiffs's primary duty included the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance.

Therefore, giving the administrative exemption a fair interpretation, the Court concludes that plaintiffs work in a bona fide administrative capacity, and, therefore, also fall within the administrative exemption from the FLSA's overtime compensation obligation.

In sum, plaintiffs having achieved the position of second in command at the Battle Creek Fire Department, were not "merely fire fighters" and do not come within the purview of

the Act. Rather, they fall clearly and directly within the executive and administrative exemptions to the Act.

As to liability. Although the Court has concluded that the plaintiffs are not within the class of employees subject to FLSA coverage, the Court will briefly address the liability issue in this case.

The FLSA does not state whether time spent on-call is working time, but the United States Supreme Court has held that "under some circumstances waiting time is compensable." Adair versus the Charter County of Wayne, 452 F.3d, 482, at 486, 87, Sixth Circuit 2006.

According to the Supreme Court, the result in a particular case turns on whether an employee's time "is spent predominantly for the employer's benefit or for the employee's benefits." A question "dependent upon all the circumstances of the case."

Martin versus the Ohio Turnpike Commission, 968 F.2d 606 at 609, Sixth Circuit 1992.

"Facts may show that the employee was engaged to wait, or they may show that he waited to be engaged." Skidmore versus Swift and Company, 323 U.S. 134 at 137, 1944. Each case must stand on its own facts. Id.

The Sixth Circuit has instructed that "on-call time spent at home may be compensable if the restrictions imposed are so onerous as to prevent employees from effectively using

the time for personal pursuits." That's Martin case 968 F.2d at 611. "The employees must show that on-call policy imposes additional burdens that seriously interfere with their ability to use the time for personal pursuits." Id.

plaintiffs testified that standby status required battalion chiefs to monitor fire department radio traffic, answer telephone calls, respond to all structure fires, and address any staffing issues that arose. Rosalee Holt and Carrie Erskine, plaintiffs's spouses, testified that while on standby status plaintiffs could not be out of telephone or radio range, drink alcoholic beverages, baby-sit, supervise or care for minor children who were unable to be left alone, or travel in one vehicle with family and friends so that they were free to leave at a moment's notice to respond to any emergency.

Rosalee Holt testified that they were "prisoners" in their own home and plaintiff Holt was precluded from attending out of town school functions. However, Chief Houseman testified that they would cover for each other when conflicts arose. Defendant also submitted the following contrary evidence: Neither plaintiff was required to spend the entire night monitoring for calls and were permitted to sleep. Chief Schmaltz testified that he did not take the radio into the house to monitor radio traffic. He left the radio in his car. Plaintiff Holt testified that Chief Houseman expected that Holt would listen to the radio until bedtime, however, Chief

Houseman testified at his deposition that keeping the radio with you was optional. According to Chief Houseman, "duty chiefs" that is, the fire chief and the Battle Creek battalion chief, only had to monitor alerts, not monitor the radio. Chief Houseman kept only the pager with him. Plaintiff Holt testified that he listened to the radio because it would be the easiest way for the fire fighters to get to me.

Carrie Erskine, whose testimony the Court found quite credible, testified that the noise of the radio traffic was "the biggest disturbance" but she also testified that plaintiff Erskine "liked to monitor the radio".

Over a three-year period, there were approximately 124 to 137 structure fires that occurred when plaintiffs may have been on-call. In other words, while the occurrence of structure fires is unpredictable, a point plaintiffs emphasized regularly, the frequency with which they occurred in the three-year period was nonetheless not even one per week.

Chief Houseman estimated the number of calls to multivelicle accidents as one per year. Rosalee Holt conceded that over the years that Holt was a battalion chief their dinners out at restaurants were interrupted "less than five times" by calls that Holt had to take. Rosalee Holt testified that while Holt did not mow the grass, paint the house, or work on his cars, he could pretty much, he could do "pretty much everything else" around the house while on standby.

Chief Schmaltz testified that the pager made an audible sound that did not need to be monitored while on standby. Chief Schmaltz was able to mow his lawn and do most household activities while on standby. The only restrictions to which Chief Schmaltz strictly adhered were the no alcohol and the geographical limit restrictions. Chief Schmaltz testified that he wanted plaintiffs to be "relaxed" when they were at home on standby.

Chief Houseman, again, whose testimony the Court found to be very credible, similarly testified that while duty chiefs never drank alcohol "we may go outside and mow our lawn or even golf." Houseman did not want to micromanage the lives of the battalion chiefs while they were on standby. He expressly rejected the proposition that being on-call was "onerous". He testified that the battalion chiefs did not complain to him about the on-call duty.

The Court concludes that even if plaintiffs were within the classes of employees subject to FLSA coverage, their duties during standby time were not so onerous as to prevent them from effectively using the time for personal pursuits.

Given my conclusions as to the FLSA coverage and liability, the Court will not address the issue of damages.

And for all of the reasons stated herein, judgment will be entered in favor of defendant and against the plaintiffs.

1	If there's nothing further, Mr. Alvarez?
2	MR. ALVAREZ: No, Your Honor. That's it.
3	THE COURT: Mr. Kreter.
4	MR. KRETER: No, Your Honor. Thank you.
5	THE COURT: Thank you. We are adjourned.
6	THE LAW CLERK: All rise, please. Court is adjourned.
7	(Proceedings concluded, 3:40 p.m.)
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## REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

I, Kathy J. Anderson, Official Court Reporter for the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, appointed pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 753, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and correct transcript of the proceedings had in the within entitled and numbered cause on the date hereinbefore set forth; and I do further certify that the foregoing transcript has been prepared by me or under my direction.

# 

# /s/ Kathy J. Anderson

Kathy J. Anderson, RPR, FCRR
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